ACTWU vs. J.P. Stevens: 1976-1980



	ACTWU vs. J.P. Stevens: 1976-1980 In 1980, the Chicago Sun-Times characterized the conflict between textile giant J.P. Stevens & Co. and the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) as "the biggest labor-management war of the last two decades." The union's success in that "war" — gaining the first-ever collective bargaining agreements for more than 3,000 Stevens workers at 10 plants in the Carolinas and Alabama — has been widely attributed to the multifaceted "corporate campaign" program devised and directed by ACTWU staffer Ray Rogers. As the veteran labor reporter A.H. Raskin of The New York Times wrote: "Pressure on giant banks and insurance companies and other Wall Street pillars, all aimed at isolating Stevens from the financial community, helped generate a momentum … that could not be achieved through the 1976-1980 worldwide boycott of Stevens products or through more conventional uses of union muscle such as strikes and mass picketing." Raskin quoted Ray Rogers: "We took the strength of the company and made that its weakness… We forced the power elite behind J.P. Stevens — its principal leaders and companies with which it had interlocking directorates; to put the squeeze on it." The Textile Workers Union had merged in 1976 with the larger Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America to form ACTWU. The new union's leaders and AFL-CIO President George Meany immediately announced "an international consumer boycott" of Stevens' products to pressure the company to settle with the union. Ray Rogers, an experienced boycott strategist, researched Stevens and concluded that a consumer boycott could not bring enough pressure to force a contract settlement. Less than a third of Stevens' products were sold to consumers, and even those were sold under dozens of different brand names or could be identified only with registration numbers. In addition, secondary boycott laws under the National Labor Relations Act at the time made it nearly impossible to run a successful boycott campaign, since unions and their supporters were only allowed to ask consumers not to buy a product. It was illegal for unions covered by the NLRA to pressure retailers to stop selling products by boycotting stores. (After the 1988 Debartolo decision, unions are no longer prohibited from engaging in such secondary boycott activity.) The Stevens Corporate Campaign exposed, attacked and broke up the network of power supporting the company and eventually forced the big money interests behind J.P. Stevens, led by Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., to give Stevens an ultimatum — settle or else. Pressure from the Corporate Campaign "divide-and-conquer strategy" led to the resignations of top corporate officers from the boards of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co (then the nation's fourth largest bank), New York Life Insurance Co. and J.P. Stevens itself. Other highlights included organizing mass shareholder actions at J.P. Stevens' and other companies' annual meetings. More than 600 individuals and organizations each purchased a share of Stevens' stock for the campaign's first mass action in March 1977 in New York City. Hundreds of people holding stock proxies and representing unions, religious, community and political organizations lined up at the entrance to Stevens' corporate headquarters, waiting to enter to attend the company's annual meeting so that they could directly confront management. At the same time, 4,000 protesters marched around Stevens Tower. The company, which had held its annual meeting in Manhattan for many decades, moved it to South Carolina the next year and never again held it in New York. On Dec. 15, 1981, more than a year after the Stevens settlement, the textile industry newspaper the *Daily News Record* reported that "Stevens presented a history of the epic confrontation" at an annual meeting of the South Carolina Textile Manufacturers Assn. Hal Addis, Stevens' vice-president of corporate and industrial relations, said: "Of the three major tactics employed by (the union) during its confrontation with Stevens, the corporate campaign designed to cut Stevens off from the financial community was the most effective." Addis and another Stevens executive said the company was able to overcome union litigation simply by "issu(ing) a written policy of rules and regulations" and said the consumer boycott had little or no effect on sales. As part of the Stevens settlement, the company demanded what the news media called "the Ray Rogers clause," which stated in part: "…the Union will not engage in any 'corporate campaign' against the company… (and) will not in any manner attempt to effectuate the resignation of members of the Board of Directors of Stevens, or to effectuate the resignation or removal of Stevens executives from the boards of directors of other companies, or to restrict the availability of financial or credit accommodations to Stevens, or by deliberate conduct to affect materially and adversely the relationship between Stevens and any other business organization." Today, when abuses of corporate power are multiplying as rapidly as the lists of lawless acts by Stevens in the '60s and '70s, unions (as well as community, public interest, environmental and religious groups) need to learn how to challenge the irresponsible behavior of their foes. Corporate Campaign, Inc. (CCI), founded by Ray Rogers and Ed Allen in 1981, stands ready to help your organization take the offensive and win your objectives.

ACTWU vs. J.P. Stevens: 1976-1980

In 1980, the Chicago Sun-Times characterized the conflict between textile giant J.P. Stevens & Co. and the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) as "the biggest labor-management war of the last two decades."

The union's success in that "war" — gaining the first-ever collective bargaining agreements for more than 3,000 Stevens workers at 10 plants in the Carolinas and Alabama — has been widely attributed to the multifaceted "corporate campaign" program devised and directed by ACTWU staffer Ray Rogers.

As the veteran labor reporter A.H. Raskin of The New York Times wrote: "Pressure on giant banks and insurance companies and other Wall Street pillars, all aimed at isolating Stevens from the financial community, helped generate a momentum … that could not be achieved through the 1976-1980 worldwide boycott of Stevens products or through more conventional uses of union muscle such as strikes and mass picketing." Raskin quoted Ray Rogers: "We took the strength of the company and made that its weakness… We forced the power elite behind J.P. Stevens — its principal leaders and companies with which it had interlocking directorates; to put the squeeze on it."

The Textile Workers Union had merged in 1976 with the larger Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America to form ACTWU. The new union's leaders and AFL-CIO President George Meany immediately announced "an international consumer boycott" of Stevens' products to pressure the company to settle with the union.

Ray Rogers, an experienced boycott strategist, researched Stevens and concluded that a consumer boycott could not bring enough pressure to force a contract settlement. Less than a third of Stevens' products were sold to consumers, and even those were sold under dozens of different brand names or could be identified only with registration numbers. In addition, secondary boycott laws under the National Labor Relations Act at the time made it nearly impossible to run a successful boycott campaign, since unions and their supporters were only allowed to ask consumers not to buy a product. It was illegal for unions covered by the NLRA to pressure retailers to stop selling products by boycotting stores. (After the 1988 Debartolo decision, unions are no longer prohibited from engaging in such secondary boycott activity.)

The Stevens Corporate Campaign exposed, attacked and broke up the network of power supporting the company and eventually forced the big money interests behind J.P. Stevens, led by Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., to give Stevens an ultimatum — settle or else. Pressure from the Corporate Campaign "divide-and-conquer strategy" led to the resignations of top corporate officers from the boards of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co (then the nation's fourth largest bank), New York Life Insurance Co. and J.P. Stevens itself.

Other highlights included organizing mass shareholder actions at J.P. Stevens' and other companies' annual meetings. More than 600 individuals and organizations each purchased a share of Stevens' stock for the campaign's first mass action in March 1977 in New York City. Hundreds of people holding stock proxies and representing unions, religious, community and political organizations lined up at the entrance to Stevens' corporate headquarters, waiting to enter to attend the company's annual meeting so that they could directly confront management. At the same time, 4,000 protesters marched around Stevens Tower. The company, which had held its annual meeting in Manhattan for many decades, moved it to South Carolina the next year and never again held it in New York.

On Dec. 15, 1981, more than a year after the Stevens settlement, the textile industry newspaper the Daily News Record reported that "Stevens presented a history of the epic confrontation" at an annual meeting of the South Carolina Textile Manufacturers Assn. Hal Addis, Stevens' vice-president of corporate and industrial relations, said: "Of the three major tactics employed by (the union) during its confrontation with Stevens, the corporate campaign designed to cut Stevens off from the financial community was the most effective." Addis and another Stevens executive said the company was able to overcome union litigation simply by "issu(ing) a written policy of rules and regulations" and said the consumer boycott had little or no effect on sales.

As part of the Stevens settlement, the company demanded what the news media called "the Ray Rogers clause," which stated in part: "…the Union will not engage in any 'corporate campaign' against the company… (and) will not in any manner attempt to effectuate the resignation of members of the Board of Directors of Stevens, or to effectuate the resignation or removal of Stevens executives from the boards of directors of other companies, or to restrict the availability of financial or credit accommodations to Stevens, or by deliberate conduct to affect materially and adversely the relationship between Stevens and any other business organization."

Today, when abuses of corporate power are multiplying as rapidly as the lists of lawless acts by Stevens in the '60s and '70s, unions (as well as community, public interest, environmental and religious groups) need to learn how to challenge the irresponsible behavior of their foes. Corporate Campaign, Inc. (CCI), founded by Ray Rogers and Ed Allen in 1981, stands ready to help your organization take the offensive and win your objectives.

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